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Introduction;- Distribution Politics. 
The main issue in the politics of distribution can be stated 
quite simply;. Why should a ruling class or if one wishes, a ruling 
elite that controls or directly owns the principal means of production-
in the Kenyan case primarily land- suddenly »r oven gradually be 
interested in distribution? If we start by making the rather axiomatic 
assumption that it is in the interest «f the ruling elite to control 
or directly own the land and the limited eapital then the answer to 
the question ceases to be a straightforward one. Where it is straight-
forward it involves a prior demonstration that the question is the 
wrong one. 
According to the latter position, such a ruling elite would 
never be interested in distribution. Rather it is likely to be more 
interested in consolidating its position so that it can eventually 
emerge as a ruling class proper able to defend its economic and political 
position by using the state machinery at its disposal. The question 
therefore, is not how to get the ruling elite interested in distribution, 
but rather how to organise the rest to take control of the principal 
means of production. In other words, distribution cann«t be predicated 
on the very owners of the assets to be distributed but rather on the 
non-owning outsiders, be they the urban poor or the rural landless 
and millions of small-holders. 
The other view is that a ruling elite will become interested 
in distribution out of what has sometimes been referred to as "en-
lightened self-interest." According to this view the rich may 
1. See for example, Hirschman, A.O. A Journey ^Toward Progress; 
Polity .Mafcing. >• 20th Century 
Fund 1963. chapter 5, for a discussion of what he refers to as "reform-
mongers" approach. ' . . ' . . . . . 
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fear rightly or wrongly that unless the burden of the poor is somehow 
eased, the latters revolutionary potential may be realised, in which 
case the farmer will lose all in a total revolution. In order, therefore, 
to avoid the "grim" prospects of losing all, the rich may be prepared 
to give up something, sometimes to the extent of investing heavily 
in certain areas such as education and health. The long-term pay-off 
a 
would be better educated and healthier labour to operate the rich's 
capital. 
A variation of the "enlightened self-interest" view is that 
cleavages within a ruling elite may be serious enough for some groups 
to seek support from other groups in the polity thereby increasing the 
« 
effective representation of the hitherto outside groups, Thus "in some 
circumstances a rising industrial bourgeoisie and the dominant rural 
groups (be they feudal lords or rich peasants) will eventually fall 
out over the setting of the prices of agricultural products relative 
to those of industrial goods." As all urban groups have an interest 
in cheap food this may lead to an alliance between the urban workers 
and urban capitalists against the landed interests. "With the same 
end in mind they may also side with peasant's demands for distributist 
land reform if the resulting small-holder system promises a better 
economic and political accomodation." ^ 
The major problem with the "enlightened self-interest" 
argument and its variation is that they are both premised on the 
psychological and sociological "Ifs" of the ruling groups and as such 
they put the destiny of the poor at the mercy of Social/Psychological 
variables they cannot control. At best the argument is patronising to 
the poor. A t worst, the argument assumes "trickle down" benefits to the 
the poor from a position of helplessness even if we assume increasing 
t _ See C.Ii.Gi' Bell''Chapteir'^IT-in Hoflis"Chener-y*et*alv ^ i - ' - y '•'' 
stribution With Growth Oxford University Press, 1974pp. 54 ff. for an 
elaboration of the argument. 
•2. Bell op cit 
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better representation, for the simple reason that no ruling group would 
be "enlightened" enough to work itself out of control. 
A more likely situation is that the so-called "enlightened-
self-interest" would be a public relations exercise aimed at blurring 
the contradictions by putting the emphasis on the less vital aspects 
of the economy, while all along ignoring the principal questions of 
land ownership and access to capital. Thus one would expect the question 
of incomes to be discussed primarily in terms of wage employment and 
taxation policies, and reforms would be instituted in these areas. 
This would be a "safe" approach in a capitalist country like Kenya 
which heavily subscribes to the notion of growth, for then "good" eeonomic 
arguments could be adduced to show why things are the way they are, 
or should be. Thus it can for example be argued that the industrial 
sector is not growing as fast as the labour supply and thus there is 
increasing unemployment. A t the same time it can be shown that taxes 
are not too heavy on the poor and the rich cannot be taxed anymore 
without endagering investment potential. Conversely it can shown that 
tax relief on the poor increases consumption and dissipates investments. 
W i t h reference to the supply of labour the question of the kind of 
training available and to w h o m , is likely to discussed superficially 
and if discussed seriously, the obvious recommendations are likely 
to go unimplemented. By the same token, taxation is likely to be 
presented as a distributive mechanism while it is obvious that taxing 
the rich - even when the taxes are heavy - does not m e a n automatically . 
benefitting the poor. The real issue is what one does with the revenue. 
The Planning/Administrative equivalent of the "enlightened 
ru; 
selfinterest" view is decentralisation of decision-making from, in the 
case of Kenya, the national level to the district level, so that the 
smaller unit is able to take local conditions into account and thus 
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facilitate better allocation and utilisation of scarce resources. This 
argument, like its political equivalent has many shortcomings. First, 
decentralisation or devolution of decision-making is meaningful only 
if the poor are allowed to play an active role in determing how 
resources are allocated. Secondly, decentralisation though a necessary 
condition for reducing inequality need not involve the poor at all, 
unless the latter-are already organised to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by decentralised decision-making. In other words, 
real decentralisation - which must include financial decentralisation-
m u s t be complemented by local mobilisation otherwise the former might 
make the situation worse than before by allowing local dominant groups 
to capture the decentralised institutions and lines of access to the, 
1 
detriment of the poor. Thus, in the absence of a "poor-oriented 
mobilization", decentralisation could easily become the best form of 
mystification. It is difficult to imagine a "poor-oriented mobilization" 
springing from above, purely, as an administrative issue in the absence 
of a similar kind of ideology. In the presence of such an ideology, 
then, there would be no need to impose the administrative mechanism 
for then it would be a logical consequence of the former. 
Kenya is at present engaged in decentralising planning to the 
District level, and to some it looks like an exercise in bringing the 
central government closer to the people for the purpose of better 
1 . See Bell. Op.cit. p. 66. Also Ng'ethe "Development Admini-
stration and Decentralisation;: Some Political/Administrative Conside.-
of Nairobi. I.D.S. W P . 257 1976 and Ng'ethe et al. 
"Reaching the Rural Poor: Lessons from The Special Rural Development 
Programme in Kenya". Paper originally prepared for the International 
Conference of Agricultural Economists at Nairobi, A u g . 1976. See also 
Schaffer, B.B. "The Deadlock in Development Administration" in Politics 
aiiB Change in Developing Countries. O.T. Leys (Ed). Cambridge 
University Press 1969 for a critique of the Community Development 
approach in relation to issues of development administration. 
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control especially in the light of the miniscule finances and financial 
powers granted to the District Development Committees. This issue is, 
however, too broad to be fully discussed here. Instead, we shall 
concentrate on the issue of income distribution proper and the Govern-
ment's reaction to the problem. First we shall present the findings 
of the I.L.O. mission to Kenya in 1 9 7 2 .
1
 and secondly we shall discuss 
the Governments reaction to the findings. 
Income Distribution in Kenya - A Study in inequality. 
The I.L.O. mission took a fairly comprehensive view of the 
problems of incomes in Kenya. That is to say, the Mission concerned 
itself not with the purely technical aspects of income distribution 
but with what it termed a developmental "strategy for increasing p 
productive employment in Kenya." As the title of the report correctly 
implies, "Productive employment" was the key organising concept of the-
report. Thus, the mission tried to provide descriptive data on rural 
employment problems, migration into the urban areas, urban employment 
problems, employment problems among particular groups, inequality and 
imbalance, and the colonial emergence of the whole problem of employment 
and income maldistribution. The report then w e n t on to suggest a 
sector by seotor analysis with a view to providing guidelines for 
increasing sectoral productive employment. Throughout the report, the 
authors were at pains to point out that their conception of employment 
was a great deal broader than the conventional one. They conceived 
employment to include the formal sector, the informal sector, and m o s t 
important, the people with insufficient land and those "occupied for 
very long hours" but whose "return from this work provide no more than 
a poverty standard of living". In other words, the mission claimed to 
1 . Employment, Incomes and Equality; A Strategy for Increasing 
productive employment in Kenya. I.L.O. Geneva 1972. 
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have focussed on the poor and not just the unemployed. Said the 
mission: 
"Focusing on poverty has one fundamental implication for 
the coverage of the report: One is drawn to consider all 
poverty groups, not just the unemployed or even those working 
short time. Those with insufficient land, or the working 
poor in the towns, are often occupied for "very long hours. 
But if their returns from this work provide no more than 
a poverty standard of living they are just as much part 
of the problem of the unemployed.
1
'
1 
Since the data is readily available in the report, we shall 
in this section concentrate on the major conclusions and focus speci-
fically on the issue of income distribution, per se. The overall 
conclusion of the mission was quite clear viz. that the development 
strategy in Kenya since independence has relied primarily on the 
continuation of the former colonial structures. Those structures 
invariably created inequalities and were intended to do so. The 
strategy of .the colonial regime was to emphasise growth mainly of the 
formal agricultural sector since that was the main source of income 
for the settlers', exports and foreign exchange for the country, tax 
revenue for the Government and, in turn, a level and pattern of demand 
for goods and services somewhat above the average level of the middle 
class in Europe." The reliance on the old structures and strategies 
has, not unexpectly, we might add;, resulted"in growth particularly 
in agriculture, small-scale sector, as well as industry and services. 
Yet unemployment and gross inequality continue and in some respects 
2 
may even have increased." The data below illustrates some of the 
bases of the conclusion. It should be pointed out, however, that 
1 , I.L.O. Mission. 0 £ . cit. p.,3 
,2. Ibid p . 83: Several other people have arrived at this 
conclusion independently. See in particular Colin Leys Neo-Colonialism 
and Under-development in Kenya . HEP 1975 
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data and particularly data on income distribution in the colonial 
days is not easily available and, therefore, the I.L.O. report lacks 
a vital historical dimension. 
To state the obvious, the majority of the people in Kenya 
live in the rural areas. It is, therefore, important to first and 
foremost focus on this majority, which not only includes the majority 
of the poor in Kenya, but also the poorest of the poor, and hence most 
of the largest groups for any strategy aimed at mitigating inequality 
Table I, overleaf, shows the state of income distribution in the rural 
areas. The table only gives the sources of Incomes in the rural areas 
and as such does not address itself to the question of individual 
incomes or rural regional incomes, and neither does it address itself 
to the question of incomes among various groups in the rural areas. 
A n interesting observation from the data is that 40$ of the K£231 million 
came from sources other than agriculture as such-. 
Of more relevance to us is table II which shows the distri-
bution of earnings among people employed in the formal agricultural 
sector and forestry. (The two are are often statistically grouped 
together.) 
The data from table II shows that over 90$ of the people 
earned less than KSb.200/= per month, which is an indication of a 
highly skewed distribution of incomes in these two sectors. Now, it 
might be argued that there is something intrinsic to the formal 
agricultural sector that forces the distribution of incomes to be 
skewed in the manner shown in Table II. Additional data suggests that 
the size of the farm is an important contributor to the skeweness of 
the distribution, for among other things ..'it.i.s th'fe big - farmer ....... 
who is likely to have access to credit, knowledge and modern agricultural 
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Table I Rural Incomes, 1969 
1. Gross domestic product at factor cost 
outside the monetary economy: 
Agriculture 
Other 
2. Contribution of small-scale agriculture to the 
gross domestic product in the monetary sector 
at factor cost: 
Accruing to owners 
Other items 
3. Estimate of contribution of African-owned part 
of large-scale agricultural sector to the gross 
domestic product in the monetary sector, at factor 
cost (net of worker's earnings) 
4. African agricultural wages in the modern 
agricultural sector 
5. Assumed remittances from the urban sector (20 per 
cent of the remainder of the African wage bill) 
6. Contribution of small-scale rural non-agricultural 
enterprises to gross domestic product in the 
monetary sector: 
Accruing to owners 
Accruing to hired workers 
7. Earnings from wage employment in rural 
non-agricultural industries in the modern 
sector 
£ million 
89.0 
26.1 
20.7 
9.1 
8.7 
10.6 
18.3 
13.6 
4.6 
30.7 
Total 231.4 
Source: ILO, Employment Incomes and Equality, p . 333. 
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Table II Distribution of Income in Agriculture and Forestry 
Income Groups Percentage of 
(Sh. per month) Employees 
100 and less 61.5 
100 - 149 19.9 
150 - 199 9.9 
200 - 299 3.3 
300 - 399 1.6 
400 - 599 1.1 
600 - 999 0.7 
1 0 0 0 — ' 1 4 9 9 0.7 
1500 - 1999 0.5 
Over 2000 0.9 
Source: 110 , Employment, Incomes and Equality, op.clt., Table 60,p.354. 
' 1 
technologies. Table III, among other things suggests that land size 
is an important f a c t p r . I n complementing table II, Table III Shows 
that even when all the economic groups in the rural" "areas" are considered, 
we still have a skewed distribution, thus making the majority of the 
rural households poor, since the majority of them belong to the last 2 category of small-holders, pastoralists. unemployed-and landless, 
1 . Studies on rural technology and credit availability have tended 
to confirm this hypothesis. See among others. "The Second Overall 
Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme in Kenya 
Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi, Ocassional Paper No.20,1975. 
2. For more information see I.L.O. op.cit. pp. 33-43. p. 75 and p.96 
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Table III - 1 0 -
Household Income Distribution by Economic Group and Income Size. 
1968 - 70. 
Economic Group Annual Income 
Big Farmers • 
Less Prosperous Big Farmers 
Prosperous Smallholder 
and better - off 
Owners of non-agricultural 
rural Enterprises 
Significant proportion of 
smallholders and most 
owners of non-agricultural 
Rural Enterprises 
Employees in Formal 
Sector Agriculture and a small 
proportion of owners of non-
agricultural Rural Enterprises 
Workers employed on 
small holding and in rural 
non-agricultural enterprises; 
sizeable number of smallholders 
Smallholders; pastoralists in 
semi-arid and arid zones; 
unemployed and landless persons in rural 
areas 
1000 and over 
600 - 1000 
200 - 600 
120 - 200 
60 - 120 
20 - 60 
20 or less 
Source: ILO, Employment, Incomes and Equality, Table 25,p.74 
It should be pointed out here that there is a real dearth 
of firm data on personal incomes in the rural areas. It is for this 
reason that some researchers have argued that it is better to assess 
the distribution of income related items such as consumer durables., 
cattle etc. Studies at the Institute for Development Studies show 
that even using the criteria of "income related items" an "unequal 
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1 
distribution of economic status" is still revealed. 
Referring specifically to the question of rural incomes the 
I.L.O. mission concluded that "the group of persons who have failed 
to derive much benefit from the growth generated since independence 
includes the great majority of small-holders > employees in the l-ural sector 
urban 2 
/^working poor and the urban and rural unemployed". We now turn to 
the question of urban income distribution. Table IV below summarises 
the situation as of 1968 - 1969. The data presented in Table IV has 
Table IV Urban household Income distribution before and after tax 
1968-69 
Income brackets House holds Share of total urban 
(Sh. per month before tax) households income (percentage) 
Absolute Number Percentage Before After tax 
(thousands) Tax 
0 - 199 16.3 8.5 1,1 1.1 
eoo - 299 31.9 16.6 4.8 4.8 
300 - 399 25.5 13.3 5.2 5.3 
400 - 499 17.4 9-1 4.6 4.6 
500 - 699 26.0 13.5 9.2 9.3 
700 - 999 19.0 9.9 9.6 9.5 
1000 - 1399 18.9 9.9 13.4 14.3 
1400 - 1999 17.8 9.3 17.9 17.8 
2000 and Over 19.1 9.9 34.1 33.3 
Total 191.8 100 100 100 
1 . Total may not add up exactly owing to rounding. 
Source: I.L.O. page. 75. 
1 . See. Diana Hunt,. "Methodological Issues and Selected Findings 
of an Analysis of the Distribution of Wealth and Income in Mbere Division-, 
Eastern Kenya" I.D.S. Working Paper No. 212. (March 75) and Michael Cowen 
"Concentration of Sales and Assets: Dairy Cattle and Tea in Maguti, 
1964-71." I.D.S. Working Paper No. 146 1972. The point made above did 
not originate w i t h the author. It was made in L.P. Mureithi and J.O. 
Otieno J'Food, Population and Rural Development in Kenya: Progress, 
Policies, Problems and Prospects." p. 47, Paper presented at the XVI 
International Conference of Agricultural Economists. Nairobi, Kenya, 
August, 1976. 
2. Op.cit. page 96. 
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serious shortcomings by self-admission of the I.L.O. mission. The 
major shortcoming is that the sample omitted most of the urban shanty 
areas and also European and Asian households. The result was an 
exclusion of many African household servants., many of whom earn less 
than 200/= a month. The data thus understates both the proportion 
earning more than 1,000/= a month and the proportion earning less than 
200/= a month. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the data shows a 
high degree of income concentration among households. The top 10 and 
20 percent of households account for 35 and 55 percent of the total 
urban household income respectively, while the botton 25 per cent 
receive a mere 6 percent.~ 
Apart from showing the income concentration among households. 
the data in table IV raises important questions on the distributive 
role of taxation in Kenya. It is quite evident that income tax did 
little to alter the situation.Even highly progressive income tax might 
simply reduce the shares of those earning very high incomes without 
in any way affecting the low income earners. That is to say., the 
benefits to the poor accruing from highly progressive taxation system 
are not automatic. They can only follow through extra distributive " 
measures other than mere penalising of the rich to increase government 
revenue. In other words, the issue is really not the rate of taxation 
2 
but the existence or non-existence of distributive mechanisms. If the 
1 . Other less biased data shows that the proportion of employees 
in the formal sector (excluding agriculture and mining) earning less than 
200/= was 17 percent in Nairobi. 17.6 per cent in Mombasa and 33.9 per 
cent in Kisumu compared with 6.5. per cent, 14.7 per cent and 8.9 per 
cent respectively according to Table IV. I.L.O. Op. Cit p . 76. 
2. There is some evidence to.show that the Income Tax structure 
in Kenya has attempted to become slightly more progressive since 1972 
especially with reference to personal Income Tax. This was especially 
so after the introduction in 1973 of "tax relief" system of deducting 
allowances for income tax purpose.i.e. allowances are given on total 
tax liability rather than on gross income as in the past. The old 
system, by its way of calculation gave more tax relief to those with 
higher income and less to those with lov/er incomes. In the same year 
1973; a new personal income tax rate was introduced; which some claim 
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issue is not taxation as such but how the money is spent, then
;
table over-
leaf; assumes some importance because it throws some light on regional 
expenditures and disparities. 
It is correct to say that a high proportion of national output 
and income is generated in a few districts. Other districts, and 
especially in Eastern and North-Eastern Provinces have a very small 
share in total economic activity. However Table V gives just one 
indication of regional disparities. Another way of measuring regional 
disparities would be to look at total government expenditure in each 
district. Unfortunately the Kenya Government provides statistics only 
on a ministerial basis although work is under way by the Ministry of 
Finance and economic Planning to disaggregate the statistics on a 
1 
District by District basis. In terms of the vital question of land 
availability.. Table V begins to answer some questions. W h e n columns G 
and H are read carefully, one begins to form pretty accurate hypotheses 
as to where the race for land acquisition is going on. It should be 
noted in this respect that the m o s t crowded provinces currently hold 
the political power. 
Footnote No.2 from Page 12 Continues. 
was more progressive than before. However, the problem of escaping 
taxes or even downright waiving through political influence still 
remains. For details on the structure of income tax in Kenya see among 
others. "Income Elasticity of Tax structure, in Kenya", by A . M . Ole 
M . A . thesis, University of Nairobi, 1975, J.R. Nellis. "Who pays Tax 
in Kenya?" Scandinavian Inst, of African Studies. Research Report 
N o . 11. 1973; V/estlake "Kenya's Extraneous and Irrational System of 
Personal Income Taxation". I.D.S. Staff Paper No. 101 1971; M.Westlake 
"Kenya's Indirect Tax structure and the Distribution of Income" I.D.S 
Staff Paper 102 1971. 
1. District level research shows that even within the Districts 
there are enormous disparities with resources and Incomes tending to 
to flow into areas which were originally (Settled by the colonial 
settlers. This is certainly true of Baringo District. See for example 
Kabiru Kinyanjui and Njuguna Ng'ethe. Training Within Underdevelopment: 
The Case of Baringo Development Training Centre: A n Evaluation" 
on Behalf of the Ministry of Housing and Social Services. Nairobi 
June 1976, 
CO 
CM 
P4 
10 
fi 
Table V SELECTED INDICATORS OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES, 1969-70 
B D G 
Province and 
District 
Population Population 
(thousands) per km 
K m . of road, 
per l,000km
£ 
Banking in 
terms of 
educatio-
nal expe-
nditure 
E F 
Percentage Area 
of population under 
in primary cash 
school crops as 
% culti-
vated area 
H 
Percentage 
of hi$h-
potential 
cultivated 
area/ 
Availability 
of Good agricul 
land (Hectares 
per person) 
Coast • ) ' ' • [ 
Kilifi 302 24 56.7 19 7.6 " 66 8'. 4 0.5 
Kwal e 206 25 60.7 21 7.1 42 15.3 0.8 
Lamu 22 4 22.2 32 4.6 — 1.1 3.3 
Mombasa 247 - 200.5 n. a 10.6 — — n . a 
Taita 111 6 22. 5 20 16.7 66 2.5 0.5 
Tana' River 51 1 . 14.1 25 7.7 - 1.9 2.4 
North-Eas tern 
Garissa 64 1 11.8 31 2.5 — — _ 
Mandera 95 4 10.6 33 1.5 — • — — 
Wajir 86 2 17.9 29 1.5 - - • -
Eastern 
Embu 179 62 123.3 17 17.2 7 24.4 0.6 
Isiolo 30 1 13.6 30 8.3 — — n. a 
Kitui 343 11 40.8 14 12.4 16 2.2 0.9 
Machakos 707 50 65.6 3 17.8 24 8.8 0.4 
Marsabit 52 1 13-7 27 3.9 — 0.05 n . a 
Meru 597 63 69.0 7 13.3 35 ' 24.3 0.4 
C entral 
Kiambu 476 127 267.3 1 20.9 41 48.1 0.4 
Kirinyanga 217 146 151.2 15 14.5 23 68. 5- 0.5 
Murang' a 445 178 204.1 4 21.9 18 84.0 0.5 
Nyandarua 177 54 127.6 18 19.5 86 75.0 1.5 
Nyeri 361 108 130.5 5 23.8 37 ... 48.6, . 0.4 
i 
-st-
Table V continued 
Province and 
District 
A B C D E F G H 
Baringo 162 15 61.2 13 9.8 — 15.6 1.2 
Elgeyo Marakwet 159 57 99.8 8 9.7 23 38.1 0.7 
Kajiado 86 4 39.0 23 9.0 - 1.1 n.a 
Kericho 479 97 139.3 11 11.2 16 77.7 0.8 
Laikipia 66 7 55.3 22 12.1 
i 13.4 2.1 
Nakuru 291 40 127.1 13 9.8 - 41.5 1.0 
Nandi 209 75 133.7 8 9.7 8 85.4 1.1 
Narok 125 7 46.3 24 5.0 - 49;o 7.3 
Samburu 70 3 20.2 28 3-3 - 6.7 2.2 
Trans-Nzoia 124 50 134.6 8 9.7 - 84.2 1.7 
Turkana 165 2 13.2 26 0.9 - 0.2 n. a 
Uasin Gishu 191 50 135.8 8 9.7 - 86.5 1.7 
West Pokot 82 16 71.8 8 9.7 - 28.2 1.3 
Uyanza 
Kisii 675 '304 212.1 9 12.6 31 100.0 0.3 
Kisumu 401 192) 173.4 6 (10.8 21) 93.7 0.6 
Si ay a 383 151) 12.9 9) 0.9 
South Nyanza 663 114 149.5 10 7.2 20 99.1 
Western 
Bungoma 345 113 138.0 12 16.8 13 82.1 0.7 
Busia 200 119 196.9 16 13.9 20 100.0 0.8 
Kakamega 783 220 176.1 2 12.4 13 92.3 0.4 
n.a. = not available - a magnitude negligible. 
Source: ILO, Employment Incomes and Equality (Geneva, 1972), Table 28.p.78 & Table 1 , P.35 
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The data provided by the I.L.O. mission does not give 
very good basis for making a final observation comparing income 
disparities between the rural and the urban areas. However the overall 
conclusion of the mission on this issue was that:-
"It is highly misleading to talk in terms of average rural 
and urban incomes. In both rural and urban areas there is 
a high degree of income inequality. Owners of large farms, 
a sizeable number of better of farmers (Some 225,000), many 
owners of non-agricultural enterprises as well as the highly 
skilled agricultural employees in the formal sector and the 
majority of rural non-agricultural employees in the formal 
sector can be described as relatively well of i.e. with 
incomes in excess of £200 a year. On the other hand nearly 
25 per Cent of urban employees in the formal sector., and the 
majority of tirban employees and self-employed persons in the 
informal sector, must be counted among the working poor. 
Nevertheless it remains true that in terms of obsolute numbers 
the great majority of the poor people in Kenya are to be 
found in the rural areas"."*" 
The opposite side of the coin is that broad groups 
of persons have benefited substantially from the growth of the economy 
since independence. These groups include Kenyans who have filled the 
high level jobs previously held by expatriates, people who somehow 
acquired land transfered from European fpimers to African settlers, 
those who have been in a position to take advantage of new opportunities 
in trading, building,, transportation, small-scale manufacturing, repair 
and service firms, and finally the relatively large group of employees 
in the modern, urban sector who have been able to secure increases of 
1. I.L.O. op.cit p. 76 
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6-8 per cent a year in their real incomes since independence.
1 
The final diagnosis by the mission was that "a high degree 
of income inequality is a characteristic features of private enterprise 
economies in an early stage of development. Further, those inequalities 
tend to be intensified with the growth of the economy over long periods 
of time. There are reasons to believe that such dynamic factors 
tending to perpetuate and intensify inequalities may be operative in 
2 
the Kenya social and economic system." 
The situation has changed little if at all since 1972 when 
the I.L.O. team conducted its study. If it has changed some believe 
it has changed for the worse or at best remained constant. The data 
in the appendix shows that the situation with reference to wage 
employment has not changed much. In every year, over i of the Africans 
in wage employment continued to earn less than 200/= per month and 
could be classified as poor. If one raises the poverty level to take 
account of the inflation since 1973? then the percentage of the poor 
I 
increases astronomically. If the unemployed are taken into account, 
the situation assumes crisis proportions. This however is an issue that 
cannot be treated in detail here without going outside our principal 
concern with the Government policies in relation to the I.L.O. findings 
/ 
aiid recommendations. Here we shall concern ourselves with three issues 
/ 
which are central to income distribution and as such more problematic. 
1. I.L.O. op.cit. Page 96. It is interesting to note that the 
I.L.O. report does not mention the politicians among those who have 
benefitted from growth. The other point is that the four categories 
(Five when we include politicians) are by no means mutually exlusive. 
If anything there is considerable., albeit non-systematic evidence to 
show that they overlap considerably. On the question of real incomes 
again there are signs that they have declined considerably since l973> 
to the extent where some are actually poorer than they were in 1972. 
The hardest hit could be the rural people due to the rise in prices of 
urban goods. 
2. I.L.O. Ibid page 97. 
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These are 1. The issue of unemployment and low incomes which was seen 
by the I.L.O. as a direct result of population growth, centre-periphery 
imbalances, and the imbalance between the formal and informal sectors. 
2. The issue of income distribution proper whose major recommendations 
were a stabilization of the incomes of the top ten percent and of 
specification of rural and urban minimum incomes. 3. The issue of 
labour employment in agriculture through land redistribution. 
The Response - Mystification or Enlightened Self Interest? 
The Kenya Government's response to the I.L.O. findings and 
other criticisms related to income distribution is contained in the 
1974-78 Development Plan and the Sessional Paper no. 10 on Employment, 
1973. The latter document was the immediate and direct response to 
1 
the I.L.O. findings and recommendations. 
According to the Government, six factors have contributed 
2 
to unemployment in Kenya. The factors are 1. rapidly increasing 
population. 2. increased school enrolments. 3. modernization itself 
which has rendered many of the traditional roles of men redundant. 
4. greater efficiency in production leading to displacement of workers. 
5. rapid growth of urban areas leading to rural urban migration. 6. 
institutional factors that have aggravated the cheapness of capital 
to labour. Of thp six factors, the Government claims the last "which 
include the tax system, tariffs,, industrial relations, and government 
regulations are especially within the power of Government to control". 
1. There is no reason here to go into details on the 
ideological nature of the I.L.O. recommendations. The interested 
reader may want to look at 1. Livingstone "Creating Employment in K^nya 
the I.L.O. Mission Report" Journal of Arlmirvi s t ra t i on Overseas vol XTTfp^ 
April, 1974 where he rightly argues that the I.L.O. recommendations were 
largely capitalist in nature. 
2. Development Plan: 1974-78 Part I: page 90-91. 
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The implication seems obvious. The rest of the factors are not 
especially within the power of the Government to control; though they 
must be taken into account w h e n formulating the-Government
1
s strategy 
which comprises 1. Continued Rapid Growth 2. Family planning 3-. Income 
Redistribution 4. Agricultural and Rural modernization 5. Education 
Reform 6. Promotion of small scale Enterprises.
1
 W i t h specific 
reference to low incomes, the Government sees the causes to include 
"lack of land to cultivate, insufficient education and training, and 
2 
insufficient access to credit and technical knowledge". This is a 
rather frank admission of the problem. One can argue that the Government 
can afford this kind of admission in a Development plan- by virtue of 
the fact that the plan does not need to address itself either to 
specifics or to immediate solutions. 
The Sessional Paper is no more specific than the Development 
Plan. In general, however, the Government accepts in rather vague 
terms the I.L.O. recommendations except the one calling for a specifi-
cation of minimum rural and urban incomes. The basis for the hedged 
non-acceptance is that "the Government feels that it possesses neither 
sufficient information nor sufficient means by which it can accept 
as' policy-, • objectives the specific minimum incomes suggested in the 
3 
report." 
:
 r
) . i' .77! • 
1 . Development' Plan op ci'f'Page. 91 
2. Ibid. Page 97. 
The most interesting thing about this is that it is phrased 
in terms of "low incomes." The other side of the coin is of course, 
excessively high incomes due to easy (political) access to land, credit 
& technical knowledge,. It can be argued that this side of the coin is 
even more relevant in the context of scarce and finite resources and 
where the nature of the game comes dangerously close to a zero-sum 
situation. In terms of priorities, therefore, limiting unfair access 
is perhaps more important, for once groups of people become unfairly 
entrenched there would be no point, in a Bero-sum situation, of"giving" 
access to the other groups, for by then it would simply be meaningless, 
and too late." 
3. The figures were. Sh.120 for rural families and Sh.200 per 
month for Urban families. The Govt, goes on to add that the idea is 
"essentially a good idea." Sessional Paper. Op clt P... 23-24.' 
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Referring to income distribution as apposed to low incomes 
the Government admits that the past policy of emphasising growth was 
wrong because it was based on the mistaken belief that "rapid economic 
growth would achieve sufficient employment automatically". The overall 
strategy, therefore would be one of emphasising competitive labour-
intensive technology. The means for pursuing the strategy would be. 
1 . an Industrial Court to regulate increases in modern-sector wages and 
salaries so that the wage increases do not exceed the general growth 
rate of the economy.^,2. Labour Survey to enable the Government to 
discover the target groups. 3. Rural Works programme in order to 
2 
increase the cash incomes of the landless and small-hoiders. 4 Labour 
Market information. The Government then goes to enumerate what it 
refers to as "fundamental changes" which are tariffs, other taxes, 
promotion of small-scale industries, education, investment in amenities 
3 
and rural development with particular emphasis on district planning. 
It is rather obvious from the above that the Government's 
strategy does not involve some of the most fundamental issues, True, the 
questions of access to land and credit (both agricultural and industrial) 
are discussed elsewhere in the plan - outside context of income di 
. 4 
distribution - but not in terms of reducing the unequal access. 
1 . A t the time when the plan was being authored, the Government 
accepted the recommendations of Report of the Commission of Inquiry-
Public Service Structure and Renumeration 1971 chaired by 'D.N. Ndegwa 
which\among others recommended heavy increases in the salaries of 
certain categories of civil servants and also recommended that they 
be allowed to own and operate businesses. The Government's acceptance 
was contained in Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1974. 
2. The Government has already started giving grants to District 
Development Committees under this programme. The grant is meant for 
labour-intensive rural activities such as afforestation and conservation 
activities. The projects however m u s t be approved by the Provincial 
Planning Officer. The grants are quite small per District (64,000/= for 
Baringo District in 1974/75') and yet they have sometimes been reclaimed 
by the Treasury for non-utilisation, which raises the issue of local 
mobilisation. 
3- Development Plan op.cit pp.95-98. 
4. See the relevant chanters in the plan, especially chapters 4, 
7
;
 10, 12, and 17. 
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The question of land is of particular importance since the 
Government agrees that lack of land to cultivate is one of the causes 
of low incomes. But having accepted that, the issue is then seen in 
terms of resettling the landless in the non-utilised state land. This 
is somewhat tricky for the underlying logic seems to be that there is 
an infinite supply of good agricultural state land in the country. 
If anything the case is quite the opposite. The demand could be 
infinite but the supply is definitely limited. The issue here is whether 
the logic of settlement schemes on unused state land is not actually 
incompatible with the logic of distribution and equity. In the case of 
land, the latter, if it is genuine
s
 must assume a fixed supply, otherwise 
the issue of distribution does not arise at all except in the admini-
strative sense of making sure that the land is acquired in an orderly 
fashion.
L
 Assuming an infinite supply seems to be a political strategy 
intended to defer the questions on how the already occupied land has 
been distributed. Since the assumption is in reality wrong, the ensuing 
strategy can only be effective as a temporary measure, without the 
usually expected advantages of supplying quidelines for long-term 
policies. 
The political importance of the land issue is underscored by 
the fact that while the Government was prepared to partially accept the 
recommendations of the I.L.O. mission with specific reference to income 
2 
distribution, it was not prepared to accept or even discuss the 
* 
recommendations on land redistribution. The I.L.O. recommended. 
1. Even in the administrative sense, it is not that straight-
forward, unless we make the prior assumption that the landless are 
clearly recognised as such and furthermore that they are the only ones 
who are free as a matter of right to state their claims on unused .'-•stake 
land and all the state has to do is recognise the claims. There could 
of course be a distributive element where the Government re-settles 
the people on land formerly owned by foreigners. The distributive 
element, however, depends on whether the resettled people receive the 
land at subsidised prices, and also on v/ho and how many people get 
resettled on formerly occupied land. 
2. Except the recommendation that minimum household income 
targets should be specified. Sh. 120 per month for rural families and 
Sh. 200/= per month for urban families (p.15). 
3. I.L.O. OB.oit P'P .17-18. 
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(a) If the joint owners of a farm prefer to run it as a 
number of individual plots they should be actively e 
encouraged to do so, 
(b) The Government should act as a willing buyer for any large 
farm offered for sale in the high potential areas for 
subdivision into settlement plots. 
(c) The Government should reposes any farm seriously in 
arrears with repayment to the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation or the Agricultural Development Corporation, 
(d) The larger holdings on existing settlement schemes should 
/ 
be subdivided. , 
(e) In the longer-tertfi, a progressive land tax related to the 
/ ' 
size and productive potential of the holding should be 
introduced, 
(f) In the longer-term, a ceiling on individual land holdings 
..should be considered. 
The Government's total response to these specific proposals 
was:- "The discussion of agriculture in the report generally 
conforms to the Government's understanding of the important 
issues in this sector _ In particular., the Government 
accepts that programmes to achieve a more intensified use 
of land should be the central thrust of the country's policy 
for agriculture; this will be done in a framework which 
promotes co-operative farming in the large-scale farming areas. 
It is in the context of an intensification policy that 
programmes for land redistribution, for an expansion and 
improvement in extension services, and for farmers' education 
will be formulated. In addition, the Government's pricing 
policies and agriculrural research programmes will be 
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„1 
formulated with this objective in mind." 
Considering the specific nature of the proposals, and the 
fact that in other sections of the Sessional Paper the Government's 
response is quite specific, the above statement is astounding in its 
2 
vagueness. The Development Plan is perhaps more specific in its 
3 
mention of the need to start new settlement schemes. "so that more 
people will be employed and the land will be used more intensively." 
However, the plan is equally specific in its emphasis of the importance 
of largesc.alc farms which "in 1972 produced about 48 per cent of the 
gross marketed agricultural production / and / will therefore continue 
to receive support from various Government programmes such as the 
credit facilities organised by the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
and the extension services". Smallholder production is expected to 
4 
become more important over time. The issue of individual land ceiling 
ia again not mentioned, and subdivision is referred to strictly in 
terms of large-scale farms formerly owned by expartriates and which have 
encountered capital and managerial difficulties after transfer to 
Africans. Where appropriate "the ministry will encourage subdivisions'. 5 
of these farms into smaller more manageable units". 
1 . Sessional Paper Mo 10 of 1973 on Employment, Republic of . 
Kenya, Government Printer, P . 34.6p £ij, 
2. Development plan op.cit Page 199-200. 
3. In keeping with the Government's conception of the land 
problem. 
4. '•' It is interesting that the percentage quoted is that of large 
farms. The rest, (52$) largely comes from small farmers. 
5. Plan op. cit Page 199-200. 
Note: The refusal to discuss the land question in specific details 
assumes some importance when one observes that out of the more than 
eighty specific proposals that are discussed in the Sessional Paper, 
only about ten are rejected outrightly. The others are either "shown" 
to be" part of existing government policy or they receive modified 
acceptance. 
IDS/WP 284 
- 24 -
While, it is difficult to summarize the overall government's 
reaction to income distribution issues, it is fair to say that on tho 
whole the reaction reveals throe strategies. The overall 
broad strategy has been to admit that the development policy of 
emphasising growth has left a lot to be desired by way of generating 
employment and reducing inequalities either inherited from the colonial 
era or generated since independence. Secondly, the Government has 
adopted the strategy of accepting as many proposals for reform as 
possible either in a modified form, or by simply arguing that the 
proposed reforms have already been incooperated into on-going govern-
ment programmes. Where it cannot be argued that the reforms have 
already been incooperated into on-going programmes, the Government has 
attempted to argue that they are already part of the overall policy. 
Finally, the Government has tended to reject outright any suggestions 
that call for basic structural changes. The real political issue, 
however, is not really the Government's strategies for coping with 
criticisms, but the explanations of these strategies. 
I 
The Politicians' Explanation - Possessive Individualism. 
The Strategies outline above are - perhaps not 
surprising given the nature of the Kenyan economic and social system 
and the general weakness of any would-be ..countervailling forces. What 
is perhaps surprising is that most of the proposed reforms have been 
fairly mild and generally compatible with the Government's philosophy 
of development and the institutions that it has accepted since indepe-
ndence. Some reform-minded members of Parliament have tended to see 
this contradiction in terms of the personal interests of some of the 
members of the executive arm. of the Government. This was perhaps best 
revealed during the parliamentary debate urging the Government to adopt 
the I.L.O. recommendations. Most of the contributors to the debate 
were arguing within the framework of the present Kenyan economic system 
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and as such they cannot even today be constructed as radicals. Yet 
they saw themselves as outsiders to the extent where some sounded 
desperate. Said one m e m b e r . 
" some of us have started wondering where we are heading. 
One member said we are moving towards the right direction.... 
he happens to be in that class of wrong doers and when this 
class is going to be attacked by the mob there will be no 
time to explain his position. So long as the goods have 
not been delivered to the people the whole class is no good 
and is condemned by the masses. .... The court of the masses 
will take action and money will not help ... where are the 
Ministers? They are loving their neighbours as they love 
themselves by grabbing all the wealth"'*' 
Another member sounded a similar note when he argued that 
"we have left the low income group in the same place where they were 
before we attained our independence. if not in a worse state than they 
were before. It is this same group of the top fellows that members 
of this House belong. It is this same group that this report directs 
it's stand". He went on to argue that the recommendations on land were 
one of the reasons why the report "has been opposed by certain people.. 
because /"the report^/
7
 . recommends that the land which is at moment 
owned by the large-scale farmers should be splitted into smaller farms". 
Though this particular member was opposed to splitting of low potential 
land he saw the need for splitting high potential land and for 
the introduction of land tax for non-utilization of land because "we 
have people today who own hundreds of acres of land which is not being 
used simply because they have enough in terms of income because they 
1 . Proceedings of the National Assembly. • Vol. 30 Page 49. 
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may be landlords somewhere .... if this does not happen now, tomorrow 
may be be too late because we are getting a few people entrenched in 
the whole system and they are grabbling everything: everything is 
1 
being grabbed by only a few people". 
A third member came very close to making a theoretical 
statement refuting the "enlightened self-interest" view. Speaking on 
the issue of land he said. 
".. It is difficult to change when the people who are 
supposed to change it are involved. ... We have sung this 
song long enough because we started in 1963. Let us not 
blame anybody now because has the Cabinet sat down and 
drafted a policy on land ceiling ... NoJ Because they are the 
biggest grabbers of land in this country. We must not just 
talk in this house. We must be able to lay the blame where 
it belongs and the Cabinet is the precise place where it 
belongs .... However, are we to sacrifice the interests 
2 
of 12 million people on the altar
 Q
f twenty three people?" 
Although the majority of the reform-minded members who contri-
buted to the debate saw the problem in terms of individual possessive-
ness, the rare one saw it in terms of the capitalist economic system, 
but even here some confusion is revealed as the following quotation 
illustrates. > 
" Our economy is capitalist and any country which bases it's 
economy on capitalism is bound to have troubles. There are 
always troubles. There are always troubles because the idea 
of capitalism is to grab and ran. They do not mind the others 
1
- /rbid Vol. .29.,.. 1973 Pago 877 - "898. , ^ . 
2. Proceedings op. cit Page 950-1054. This particular M . P . was 
then a n Assistant Minister. 
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because they believe that if they can possess the whole 
woi-ld and die tomorrow they are excused. . . what can prevent 
us from enacting a law to the effect that nobody can 
cultivate our land unless he is black like myself? ... what 
•r." can prevent us from owning all the property in this country? 
W e should have a, land ceiling so that no man can own vast 
1 
tracts of land". 
Very few saw the issue in terms of the post-independence 
ideological foundations of the Kenyan economy. One who did blamed the 
situation on the Sessional Paper Ho. 10, 1963 On African Socialism. 
He argued that "The KANU manitesto has something that causes unemployment 
in that it is said clearly in this document that there will be equal 
opportunities for all. ... Equal opportunities could be interpretted 
in different forms. Those who have wealth have interpretted it to 
mean that everybody has equal opportunities to grab what he can. Nobody 
is stopped by the KANU manifesto to grab w h a t he can and therefore 
2 
there is that equal opportunity" He concluded by urging the Govern-
ment to review the manitesto. 
On the issue of implementation one member probably eohoed the 
majority opinion of the disenchanted when he stated that" our govern-
ment has a tendency of saying yes to anything but not doing anything 
about it ... The Government has accepted very many reports in this 
country but only one of these reports has been implemented. This is 
3 
the Ndegwa Commission Report ... This report has worsened our economic 
system, / l ^ / has concentrated more on people who are already earning 
thousands and thousands of shillings in this country / " a n d ^ T disregarded 
1 . Proceedings. Op. cit Vol.30 P.44 
2. Ibid, Page 77-144 
3. This is the report referred to earlier in a footnote (p.20
N 
which raised the salaries of high-ranking civil servants and approved 
their ownership of businesses. 
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1 
the majority in this country". 
It is true that the exerpts presented above are not a 
systematic representation of the parliamentary debates on the I.L.O. 
report in particular and inequality in Kenya in general. However, 
they do represent some of the general issues usually discussed in Kenya 
in the context of inequality and poverty. One issue that probably 
deserves special mention is the question of foreign control and owner-
ship. This features very prominently both in parliamentary debates 
and the general public debate. As the excerpts above imply and some-
times explicitly state, the issue is usually discussed, not in the 
context of international capitalism but rather in the context of 
Kenyanization of the economy. The Government has an impressive record 
in terms of Kenyanization of some sectors of the economy though the 
vital sectors in industry are foreign-controlled and the indigeneous 
commercial and industrial entepreneurs are - as is well recognised-
dependent on foreign capital. The facts not withstanding, it is to 
the interest of the Government to encourage the discussion in the 
context of Kenyanisation for then the issue of international capitalism 
can easily be mystified. Thus one should probably not be suprised to 
see even reform-minded parliamentarians discussing the issue strictly 
in terms of Kenyanization. 
The explanation by the politicians tends to draw attention 
on the failure of the Kenyanization policy - not in terms of who has 
benefitted from the policy but in terms of the policy not having gone 
ffcr enough - and more important on the accumulative tendencies of 
individuals who happen to occupy certain key political positions. How 
accurate is this explanation? 
1. Proceedings Op. cit Vol 29, 1973 Page 975. 
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The major problem with the explanation is that, more often 
1 
than not, it fails. to raise the question of the nature of the system 
within which individuals can legitimately accumulate. In theory the 
nation of possessive individualism is premised on an atomised market 2 
relations society with selfperpetuating rule , and fails to take into 
account the class basis of political obligation. When the nature of 
the modern state is taken into account, it soon becomes clear that 
possessive individualism as an explanation is at best a crude first 
estimation that is in itself in need of an explanation. None of the 
modern states strictly speaking have self-perpetuating rule, and few, 
if any, operate on the basis of complete absence of political obligation 
on some kind of group basis. If the obligated group happens to be the 
possessing group, then we have a ruling economic class. Increasing 
the. opportunities for others to accumulate would simply enl-arge. the 
class i.e. it is not a distributive measure as such, but a strategy 
for enlarging the power base for the purposes of controlling the majority. 3 
Thus the explanation of the tendencies to "nyakua" by powerful indivi-
duals in Kenya, m u s t be sought in•the class nature of the Kenyan society 
as a result of the system being capitalist. 
1, The failure is perhaps not accidental. It could reflect 
the fact that the very critics of the "accumulating individuals" really 
want removed of barriers to their own accumulation, and not basic 
changes in the system that facilitates accumulation. 
2. "Possessive Individualism and Liberal Democracy" chapter VI 
in C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism 
Oxford, 1962. pp 263-277. 
3. A Swahili term meaning to "grab" or "snatch". 
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Conclusion. 
The paper has only touched the surface of the problem of 
income distribution in Kenya. It has not gone into a discussion of 
the related problems of nationalization, access to capital, taxation, 
and distribution of educational opportunities. The limited aim of the 
paper was to high-light the politics, rather than the economics. It 
is implicitly argued that the politics of distribution in Kenya is 
nowhere better illustrated than in the land issue., The limited nature 
of the paper, therefore, only allows even more limited conclusions. 
First, the strategy of accepting criticisms and proposals, 
and then implementing the least consequential tends to support the 
argument that the so-called "enlightened self-interest" can be no more 
than a good Public relations job and even here there is a limit to 
how much can be accepted, even if it is not going to be implemented. 
Second, the limit to acceptance could be seen as a fuction 
of possessive individualism as some of the excerpts above suggest. 
On the other hand, there are some of us who would argue that it is 
it is neither possessive individualism not Kinship ties. P
L
ather it is 
class politics with the double nuclcii of individualism, by those in 
decision-making capacity, and Kinship ties. 
Third, if the issue is class politics, there are reasons 
to argue that the very notion of income distribution is itself a 
mystifying notion even when there are some noticeable cleavages within 
the ruling clasfe as is the case in Kenya. (The cleavages take the form 
of intra-class conflict which is very carefully controlled in order not 
to involve the masses) Disposale incomes are a function of many factors 
the most important being ownership of land in the Kenya case. Without 
the poor's control of the process of generating incomes, the distribution 
question becomes a secondary political variable that can be manipulated 
to the interests of those who have economic and political power. To 
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manipulate the secondary variable constitutes mystification. To 
explain the manipulation in terms of possessive individualism constitute 
further mystification, and the whole equation adds up to the very 
essence of politics. The poor are likely to come out the losers. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 197M-
1965 Sh. AFRICAN ASIAN EUROPEAN OVERAL 
Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage 
Under 100 177,980 39.0 267 1.3 324 3.3 177,689 36.5 
100-149 77,550 17.0 52 0.2 5 0.1 77,607 15.9 
150-199 58,841 12.9 110 0.5 216 2.2 59,167 12.1 
200-299 64,633 14.2 416 2.0 28 0.3 6,5,077 13.4 
300-399 31,451 6.9 690 3.3 96 1.0 32,237 6.6 
400-599 20,722 4.5 1,865 8.8 179 1.8 22,766 4.7 
600-999 15,319 3.4 5,293 25.0 639 6.5 21,251 4.4 
1000-14S9 6,354 1.4 7,005 33.1 1,796 18.4 15,155 3.1 
1500-1999 2,666 0.6 1,948 9.2 1,585 16.2 6,199 1.3 
2000-3999 1,177 0.3 3,288 15.5 3,602 36.9 8,067 1.7 
4,000 & Over 489 0.1 216 1.0 1,298 13.3 2,003 0.4 
Total 456,300 100.3% 21,150 99.9% 9,758 100.0% 487,218 100.1% 
1966 Sh. 
Under 100 176,365 38.8 354 1.6 440 4.3 177,659 36.4 
100-149 77,591 17.0 56 0.3 8 0.1 77,655 15.9 
150-199 58,396 12.8 123 0.6 228 2.2 59,287 12.2 
200-299 64,770 14.2 425 2.0 32 0.3 55,227 13.4 
300-399 31,579 6.9 6 89 3.2 102 1.0 32,370 6.6 
400-599 20,767 4.6 1,903 8.8 198 1.9 22,868 4.7 
600-999 15,261 3.3 5,378 24.9 698 6.9 21,337 4.4 
1000-1499 6,263 1.4 7,127 33.0 1,825 18.0 15,215 3.1 
1500-1999 2,600 0.6 2,012 9.3 1,612 15.9 6,224 1.3 
2000-3999 1,133 0.2 2,319 10.7 3,628 35.7 8,080 1.7 
4 ,000 V& Over 3 87 0.1 228 1.1 1,396 13.7 2,011 0.4 
Total 456,152 99.9% 21,614 95.5% 10,167 100.0% 487,933 100.1% 
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DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974 
1967-• Sh. ARICAN ASIAN EUROPE OVERAL 
Total Percent Total Percent Total Percent Total Percent 
Under 100 177 ,243. 38.1 360 1 .6 434 4 .1 178,037 35 .8 
100-149 79 ,418 17.0 59 0 .3 12 0 .1 79,489 16 .0 
150-199 60 ,604 13.0 130 0 .6 281 2 .6 61,015 12 .3 
200-299 66 ,409 14.3 438 2 .0 36 0 .3 66,885 13 .4 
300-399 33 ,150 7.1 702 3 .2 112 1 .0 33,964 5 . 8* 
400-599 21 ,997 4.7 1 ,914 . 8 .7 202 1 .9 24,113 4 .8 
600-999 15 ,636 3.4 5 ,425 24 .8 704 6 .6 21,765 4 .4 
.1000-1499 6 ,388 1.4 7 ,268 33 .2 1 ,974 18 .4 15 ,630 3 .1 
1500-1999 2 ,794 0.6 2 ,018 9 .2 1 ,732 16 .1 6,544 1 .3 
2000-3999 . 1 ,091 0.2 3 ,349 15 .3 3 ,796 35 .4 8,236 1 .7 
4,000 & Over 371 0.1 245 1 .1 1 ,426 13 .3 2,042 0 .4 
Total 465 ,101 99.9% 21 ,908 100 .0% 10 ,709 99. i 8% 497,718 100 .0% 
t i ca l Abstract 
1975 (added "2" 
at the end) 
1968 Sh. 
Under 100 140,894 30. 5 372 1 .3 4U-5 3. 2 141,711 28. 1 
100-149 75,213 16. 3 56 0 .2 8 0. 1 75,277 14. 9 
150-199 64,139 13. 9 165 0 .6 292 2. 1 64,596 12. 8 
200-299 69,802 15. 1 439 1 .6 38 0. 3 70,279 13. 9 
300-399 49,151 10. 6 978 3 .5 116 0. 8 50,245 10. 0 
400-599 24,336 5. 3 1 ,940 6 .9 204 1. 5 26,480 5. 2 
600-999 22,253 4. 8 6 ,790 24 .1 769 5. 6 29,872 5. 9 
1000-1499 10,635 2. 3 7 ,951 28 .2 2 ,202 16. 0 20,788 4. 1 
1500-1999 3,139 0. 7 4 ,698 16 .7 2 ,065 15. 0 9,902 2. 0 
2000-3999 2,381 0. 5 4 ,242 15 .1 4 ,767 34. 7 11,390 2. 3 
4,000 Over 641 0. 1 515 1 .8 2 ,818 20. 5 3,974 0. 8 
Total '+62,584 100.1% 28,146 100.0 13,724 99.8 504,454 100.0% 
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DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974 
1969 Sh. AFRICAN ASIAN EUROPEAN OVERAL 
Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage 
Under 100 150,435 30.8 388 1.6 521 4.0 151,344 28.6 
100-149 61,285 12.5 58 0.2 5 0.04 61,349 11.6 
150-199 65,616 13.4 132 0.5 310 2.4 66,058 12.5 
200-299 80,133 16.4 443 1.7 44 0.3 80,620 15.2 
300-399 59,127 12.1 719 2.7 121 0.9 59,967 11.3 
400-599 24,265 5.0 2,027 7.5 206 1.6 26,499 5.0 
600-999 26,853 5.5 5,563 20.8 863 6.6 33,289 6.3 
1000-1499 13,253 2.7 7,315 27.4 2,023 15.5 22,592 4.3 
1500-1999 4,473 0.9 4,814 18.0 1,904 14.6 11,191 2.1 
2000-3999 2,934 0.6 4,636 17.4 4,140 31.8 11,710 •2.2 
4,000 &• Over 746 0.2 609 2.3 2,875 22.1 4,230 0.8 
Total 489,130 100.0% 26 ,705 100.2% 13,013 99.8 528,848 99.9-
1970 Sh. 
Under 100 146,411 29.1- 379 1.3 463 3.4 147,253 27.0' 
100-149 59,374 11.8 63 - 0.2 9 0.1 59,446 10.9' 
150-199 70,189 13.9- 268 1.0 442 3.2 70,899 13.0 
200-299" 83,956 16.7 524 1.9 54 0.4 84,534 15.5 
300-399' 61,752 12.3 • 841 3.0 126 0.9 62 ,719 11.5 
400-599 27,020 5.4 2,172 7.7 259 1.9 29,451 5.4 
600-999 y • 28,321 5.6 5,664 20.2 919 6.7 34,904 6.4 
1000-1499 14,412 2.9 7,465 26.6 2,120 15.5 23,997 4.4 
1500-1999 5,251 1.0 • 4,834 1.7.2 1,913 14.0 11,998 2.2 
2000-2^99 4,053 0.8 4,882 17.4 4,154 30.3 13,089 2.4 
3,000 8 Over 2,848 0.6 994 3.5 3,248 23.7 ; 7,090 1.3 
Total 503,587 100.1% 28,086 100.0% 13,707 - 100.1% 545,380 100.0% 
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DISTRIBUTION OF.WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974 
1971 Sh. AFRICAN ASIAN EUROPEAN OVERAL 
Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage 
Under 100 121,074 21.9 351 1.4 607 5.2 122,032 20.7 
100-149 74,750 13.5 37 0.2 6 0.1 74,793 12.7 
150-199 71,194 12.9 232 1.0 7 0.1 71,433 12.1 
200-299 85,987 15.5 332 1.4 28 0.2 86,347 14.7 
300-399 68,297 12.3 666 2.7 46 0.4 69,009 11.7 
400-599 64,724 11.7 1,731 7.1 146 1.3 66 ,601 11.3 
600-999 35,095 6.3 4,251 17.5 652 5.6 39,998 6.8 
1000-1499 16,545 3.0 5,548 22.9 1,052 9.0 23,145 3.9 
1500-1999 8,548 1.5 4,481 18.5 1,725 14.8 14,754 2.5 
2000-2999 4,625 0.8 5 ,130 21.1 '2,416 20.7 12,171 2,1 
3,000 8 Over 2,566 0.5 1,509 6.2 4,973 42.7 9,048 1.5 
Total 553,405 101.4 24,268 100.0 11,658 100.1% 589,331 100.0% 
1972 Sh. 
Under 100 90,502 15.5 154 0.6 79 0.6 90,735 14,6 
100-149 79,069 13.6 31 0.1 7 0.1 79,107 12.8 
150-199 62,839 10.8 127 0.5 1 0.0 62,967 10.2 
200-299 160,145 27.5 697 2.8 97 0.7 160,939 25.9 
300-399 87,720 15.1 1,516 6.1 144 1.1 89,380 14,4 
400-599 42,091 7.2 1,811 7.3 320 2.5 44,222 7.1 
500-999 21,105 3.6 2,261 9.1 217 1.7 23,583 3.8 
1000-1499 20,716 3.6 5,658 22.7 1,529 11,8 27,903 4.5 
1.500-1999 9,550 1.6 4,534 18.2 2,002 15.4 16,086 2.6 
2000-2999 5 ,690 1.0 5,224 21.0 2,512 19.3 13,426 2.2 
3,000 a Over 3,033 0.5 2,863 11.5 6,092 46.9 11,988 1.9 
. Total 582,460 100.0% 24,876 99.9% 13,000 100.1% 620,336 100. OS 
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DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY RACE, 1965 - 1974 
1973 Sh. AFRICAN ASIAN EUROPEAN OVERAL 
Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage 
Under 100 104,182 16.8 128 0.6 85 0.9 104,395 16.0 
100-149 75,739 12.2 8 0.0 11 0.1 75,758 11.7 
150-199 51,861 8.4 27 0.1 4 0.0 51,892 8.0 
200-399 177,581 28.6 514 2.6 62 0.6 178,157 27.4 
400-599 96,788 15.6 873 4.4 126 1.3 97,787 15.1 
600-799 46,886 . 7.6 12?3 6.3 144 1.5 48,283 7.4 
800-999 22,655 3.7 1422 7.2 205 2.1 24,282 3.7 
1000-1499' 22,189 3.6 3917 19.8 681 7.1 26,787 4.1 
1500-1999 10,606 •1.7 3491 17.6 958 10.0 15,055 2.3 
2000-2999 8,105 1.3 4386 22.2 2166 22.6 , 14,657 2.3 
3000 & Over 3,407 0.5 3776 19.1 5125 53.6 12,308 1.9 
Total 619,999 100.0% 19,795 99.9% 9,567 99.8% 649,361 99.9-
1974 Sh. 
Under 100 47,013 • 7.0 49 0.2 7 0.1 47,069 6.7 
100-149 102,62.5 15.2 5 0.0 1 0.0 102,6 31 14.6 
150-199 66,706 9.9 22 0.1 13 0.2 66,741 9.5 
200-399 179,295 26.6 465 2.3 30 0.3 179,790 25.6 
400-599 121,015 18.0 845 4.2 69 0.8 121,929 17.4 
600-799 58,693 8.7 1,011 5.1 165 1.9 59,869 8.5 
800-999 37,326 5.5 1,309 6.6 186 2.2 38,731 5.5 
1000-1499 31,697 4.7 3,780 18.9 690 8.0 36,167 5.2 
1500-1999 15,041 2.2 3,358 16.8 751 8:7 19,150 2.7 
2000-2999 9,255 1.4 4,302 21.6 1 ,620 18.7 15,177 2.2 
3,000 3 Over 4,380 0.7 4,802 24.0 5 ,115 59.2 14,297 2.0 
Total 672,956 99.9 19,948 99.8% 8 ,647 100.1% 701,551 99.3% 
CALCULATED FROM 
Source: S ta t i s t i ca l Abstract 1975. 
Kenya: Central Bureau of S ta t i s t i cs . 
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